

Why is Security Important?



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Clemens H. Cap
ORCID: 0000-0003-3958-6136

Department of Computer Science
University of Rostock
Rostock, Germany
clemens.cap@uni-rostock.de

Version 2



1. Integrity of Infrastructure
2. Protecting Personal Data
3. Binding Law
4. Social Stability
5. Technical Stability

1. Integrity of Infrastructure

The integrity of our technical and social infrastructure depends on cybersecurity solutions.

1. Integrity of Infrastructure

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Integrity

Problem

If everything is networked
then everything can be attacked over the network.

Task for the Researcher

How can we connect most devices to the network
without opening them up to the resulting risks?

3 Examples of Attacks on Entire Nations

2007 Attack on Estonia:

- **Type:** Distributed denial of service attacks.
- **Victims:** Parliament, banks, public institutions, newspapers.
- **Effect:** Country disconnected from the Internet for 4 days.

2010 Stuxnet Attack on Iran:

- **Type:** Computer virus infection of PC connected to an industrial controller.
- **Victims:** Uranium centrifuges; changing speeds produced mechanical wear-out.
- **Effect:** Damage to Iranian nuclear engineering program.

2015 Power Grid Attack on Ukraine:

- **Type:** Complex, coordinated cyber-attack consisting of many elements.
- **Victims:** Industrial and powergrid nodes.
SCADA = Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
- **Effect:** 230.000 people without electricity for 1/2 day.

Further Possible Templates of Attacks

Remote Vehicles: Autonomous, networked cars, airplanes or drones as weapons.

Virtual Theft: Thief breaks into a bank from his “homeoffice”.

Denial of Service: Power grid, transportation services, payment gateways of an entire country are disabled for 2 days.

Overuse: Lowering and raising the window blinds every 2 seconds for an entire night.

Military: Turning off weapon capabilities by software during a conflict.

Example: Israel and Syria

Example: US and Austrian Fighter Jets

Example: US and German Euro-Hawk Drones

2. Protecting Personal Data

2.1. Overview

2.2. 3 Examples of Privacy Technologies

2.3. Application: Private Scoring

Protecting personal data is an essential task in cybersecurity. Advanced crypto methods can be used for **enhancing** privacy.

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Problem

Protecting privacy is a complex problem:

- **Mind set:** An understanding the need for privacy.
- **Legal:** GDPR / DSGVO / laws and regulations.
- **Organizational:** Eg: Clean desk, know your client policies etc.
- **Technical:** Eg: Encryption, privacy by design, access control etc.

Hypothesis: Technological solutions alone often do not help.

Research Questions for You: Privacy

Why is privacy necessary to ensure the dignity of human life?

Give examples!

Where do you see **practical problems** with current data protection **legislation**?

Give examples!

Organizational measures for protecting personal data?

Give examples!

Question to be Answered by Research

Which possibilities do Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) offer?

What is a reasonable mix between cryptographic efforts, costs and (in)convenience?

3 Examples of Technologies:

- Zero Knowledge Proofs
- Secret Sharing
- Multiparty Computation

Example 1: Zero Knowledge Proofs

The Problem:

- **Peggy** wants to prove to Victor that she knows the solution to a problem.
- **Victor** wants to verify if Peggy knows the solution to a problem.

Criteria: Victor is

- **Convinced:** Believes that Peggy knows the solution.
- **Non-transferable:** Unable to claim knowledge of the solution towards others.
- **Zero-knowledge:** Learns nothing (zero) about that solution.

Practical use:

- The problem: Represents the user id of Peggy.
- The solution: Represents the password known only to Peggy.

Situation: Is that possible? Yes!

Example 2: Secret Sharing

The Problem:

- A password guards the access to a safe.
- Alice trusts her colleagues Bob, Carol, David and Erin.
- Alice learns, that one person is a traitor (but not who).
- Can Alice restrict the access in such a manner that **only two** of her colleagues **together** can access it?

Situation: Is that possible? Yes!

Alice can even impose more complex restrictions.

Example 3: Multiparty Computation: Naive Approach

Background:

- Alice, Bob, Carol and Dave each have a (private) number.
- They want to calculate the sum.

Question: Can they find an algorithm such that

- **Public output:** At the end, everybody knows the sum.
- **Anonymous input:** Nobody knows the number of any other participant.

Heads Up!

- For two persons, a sum is problematic.
- For n persons, a product is problematic as well.

Why?

Why?

Thus: Need redefinition of the problem.

Example 3: Multiparty Computation: Elaborate Approach

Background:

- There are n parties.
- f is a function of n variables denoted v_1, \dots, v_n .
- The value v_j is known only to party number j .

Problem: Find an algorithm with the following 2 properties:

- **Public output:** At the end, every party knows $r = f(v_1, \dots, v_n)$.
- **Info-minimal input:** Every party j knows only what it can deduce from r and v_j .

Situation: Is that possible? Yes!

It is a recent research area of its own, but, *essentially* yes.

Private Credit Scoring

Situation:

- Banker Alice wants to know if client Bob is able to pay back a loan.
- Bob wants that loan.
- Carol is a mobile operator and knows the payment morale of Bob

Question: How can Alice learn whether Bob should get the loan?

2.3 Application: Private Scoring Solutions (1)

Solution 1: Data to the Program

- Carol sends Bob's payment data to Alice.
- **Problem:** Privacy Alice receives detailed payment data on Bob.
- **Real life:** Schufa, Fintech access to bank API.

Solution 2: Program to the Data

- Alice sends her evaluation program to Carol who feeds it with Bob's data.
- **Problem:** IP Protection Carols learns the tricks of Alice.
- **Real life:** Not done. Has Alice loses her business case.

Solution 3: Trusted Third Party

- Trent receives data (on Bob) from Carol and algorithm from Alice.
- **Problem:** Costs & trust issues: Trent must be paid and trusted.
- **Real life:** Rarely done due to these 2 problems.

2.3 Application: Private Scoring Solutions (2)

Solution 4: Multiparty Computation

- Alice and Carol execute a multiparty protocol.
- Alice knows the answer to her question.
- Carol does not learn about the trade secrets of Alice.
- Alice does not learn Bob's data in detail.

Problem: No further disadvantages, but..

Real life:

- Protocols not well known.
- Research results rather recent.
- No wide implementations of technology in applications.
- Hopefully this will improve...

3. Binding Law

Technology may provide the required basis for applying law, but the situation can be ethically problematic.

1. Integrity of Infrastructure
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3. **Binding Law**
4. Social Stability
5. Technical Stability

Homework: Non-Repudiation

Repeat the basics: What was the protection goal of non-repudiation?

Technical Support for Legal Situations

Situation: Technology proves facts and the law governs the consequences.

Problems:

- Technology provides more or less than what the law is interested in.
- Technology provides more than deemed reasonable by society.

Technology provides more:

- Technology enables things which we do not want: Ultimate fate: Surveillance state

Technology provides less:

- Would it be possible in principle? Often: Yes. So let's implement it!
- How can we limit abuse of infrastructure once it exists?

Question

How can legally binding situations be implemented according to an ethically accepted social consensus?

Example: Criminal Prosecution

“Datenschutz als Täterschutz”

- Tracking down a criminal is made impossible by data protection.
- Where ends the data protection rights of suspects?

Core Doctrines of Law

- Commensurability of measures (“Verhältnismäßigkeit der Mittel”)
- Presumption of innocence (“Unschuldsvermutung; kein Generalverdacht”)
- Prosecutor must demonstrate guilt (“Schuldbeweis, Beweislast-Umkehr”)
- No duty of self incrimination (“Keine Verpflichtung, sich selbst zu belasten”)

In the US: “Doktrin der Früchte des vergifteten Baumes” (fruits of the poisoned tree)
Proofs obtained by illegal means must not be used in court.

Disclaimer: I am no lawyer and I am not giving legal advice.

Example: Devices as Witness

Scenario:

- My wife, kids and parents do not have to be witnesses against me.
- Reason: Protecting close human relationships.
- But: What about my mobile phone?
- Some phones know more than family knows.
- Do mobile phones need a witness protection?
- Should it be mandatory to render phone PINs and passwords?
- Should there be a backdoor for manufacturer / law enforcement?

Examples of cases:

- Carsharing location data
- Alexa witness of a murder
- Siri as key witness?

4. Social Stability

Social stability is connected with the behavior of people. Where are the limits of security technology regarding behavior?

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4. Social Stability

Example: Elections

Situation: Elections are highly regulated.

- Fairness regulations: Rules for TV debates of candidates.
- Ad regulations: No party ads near election booth.

Problem 1: Technical integrity for determining the results.

- An interesting IT problem on its own.
- [Symantec: Video on how to hack a voting machine.](#)
- [Security Magazine: Can the voting process be hacked?](#)

Problem 2: What are the right regulations for **social media**?

- In Germany, political parties have a right to get postal addresses: [Regulations](#)
- What about access to social media profiles?
- Should mass-microtargeting via Facebook profiles be permitted?
- Remember the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica Case during Trump/Clinton 2016.
Reporting by [The New York Times](#) and by [The Guardian](#).

4. Social Stability

Example: Smart Mob

Situation: Lynch-Mob against an innocent but presumed-guilty person.

- Press report: Rheinische Post
- Press reports: Die Welt
- Wikipedia article

Situation: Apple patent for remotely turning off iPhone cameras

- Press report: Forbes
- Press report: The Guardian
- Press report: ZDNet
- Press report: Heise Newsticker
- Apple Patent

How can computer science help guarantee the authenticity of data?

To which extent should computer science support this in every situation?

Where are the boundaries between fake news, propaganda and liberty of expression?

Where are the dos and dont's for stabilizing society from a computer technological perspective?

Is stability of society a higher goal than human dignity (“Menschenwürde”)?

5. Technical Stability

Technical stability is the core but – as we see – not the only goal for cybersecurity.

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Leslie Lamports Famous Definition of a Distributed System

A **distributed system** is one in which the failure of a computer you didn't even know existed can **render your own computer unusable**.

- A networked system has systemic side effects.
- The border between safety and security becomes blurred.
- Side effects (safety) may be leveraged into attacks (security).

Example: DNS

DNS: Domain Name System

- Translates hostnames (`mybank.com`) into IP addresses (`128.20.30.55`).
- IP-address is basis of global routing.
- Erroneous translation (“DNS-resolution”) causes data to go to the wrong target.
- Badguy resides at `130.77.77.77`.
- Attack causes `mybank.com` to be resolved incorrectly to `130.77.77.77`.
- Badguy gets my banking data.

Example: DNS spoofing (=DNS poisoning)

- DNS-responses often are cached and not authenticated.
- Attacker connects to network and injects DNS-response.
- Clients cache and use non-authenticated response.

Note 1: A seemingly innocent service is of core importance for security.

Note 2: Poisoning attacks try to inject fake data into caches.

Research Questions for You: DNS

Revise your knowledge on DNS and DNS-resolution!

What techniques are known to **prevent DNS spoofing attacks**?

Example: ARP

ARP: Address Resolution Protocol

- Translates (local) IP-address (130.28.8.4) to MAC-address (AC:E8:22:31:46:44).
- MAC-address is basis of (local layer 2) addressing.
- Erroneous translation (“ARP-resolution”) causes data to go to wrong recipient.
- Again ARP responses are cached by clients.

Example: ARP spoofing (=ARP poisoning)

Note: Similar situation as with DNS.

Revise your knowledge on ARP-resolution!

What techniques are known to **prevent ARP spoofing attacks**?

Example: OCSP

OCSP: Online Certificate Status Protocol

- **Problem:** Is the certificate for Alice correct or has the private key been stolen?
Need to know at time of certificate use if Alice has retracted the certificate.
- **Idea:** Special OCSP server operated by CA provides the answer.

Example: Attack the OCSP service.

- Fake OCSP-reply allows fake identities, MITM attacks etc.
- Missing OCSP-reply forces client to abort connection or assume certificate correctness.

Research Question for You: OCSP

Revise your knowledge on certificates!

Would it be a good idea to cache OCSP replies?

What other attacks can be used on OCSP?

How can they be prevented?

Appendix

Contents of Appendix

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